Government transparency and political clientelism: Evidence from randomized anti-corruption audits in Brazil

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dc.contributor.authorBobonis, Gustavo J.
dc.contributor.authorGertler, Paul J.
dc.contributor.authorGonzalez-Navarro, Marco
dc.contributor.authorNichter, Simeon
dc.coverage.spatialAmérica Latina y el Caribees_ES
dc.coverage.spatialBrasiles_ES
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-03T15:42:11Z
dc.date.available2019-09-03T15:42:11Z
dc.date.issued2019-01-31
dc.description.tableofcontentsPolitical clientelism is considered a fundamental reason why politicians are not accountable and responsive to their constituencies. In this working paper, we study whether transparency initiatives – more specifically, top-down anti-corruption audits – can reduce the incidence of vote-buying and political clientelism in the context of Brazil’s municipal government anti-corruption program. This program selected municipalities at random to audit municipal finances, which allows for causal inference. We combine the audit program data for a sample of municipalities in the country’s Northeast region with a dedicated longitudinal survey we conducted in 2011-2013 of a large representative sample of impoverished rural households. This enables us to estimate short and long-term effects of the government anti corruption audits on subsequent levels of vote-buying and political clientelism.es_ES
dc.identifier.citationBobonis, G. J., Gertler, P. J., Gonzalez-Navarro, M., & Nichter, S. (2019, January 31). Government transparency and political clientelism: Evidence from randomized anti-corruption audits in Brazil. Caracas: CAF. Retrieved from https://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1463en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttps://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1463
dc.language.isoenes_ES
dc.publisherCAFes_ES
dc.publisher.cityCaracases_ES
dc.subjectCorrupciónes_ES
dc.subjectDemocraciaes_ES
dc.subjectFortalecimiento institucionales_ES
dc.subjectGobernabilidades_ES
dc.subjectInvestigación socioeconómicaes_ES
dc.subjectSector públicoes_ES
dc.titleGovernment transparency and political clientelism: Evidence from randomized anti-corruption audits in Braziles_ES
dc.typeworkingPaperes_ES

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